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OMG—Not Something to LOL About: The 
Unintended Results of Disallowing Warrantless 
Searches of Cell Phones Incident to a Lawful Arrest 
INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether police offic-
ers must obtain a warrant prior to searching an individual’s cell 
phone incident to a lawful arrest, answering the question with a re-
sounding yes.1 While the bright-line rule established by the Supreme 
Court’s recent decision in Riley v. California appears to be a victory 
for privacy protection, the rule may also have several negative conse-
quences. Although the decision appeared to be an easy one for the 
Court to reach, lower courts will now be tasked with sorting out re-
lated issues including evolving governmental interests, officers’ reli-
ance on alternative exceptions to the warrant requirement, and ad-
vancements in technology that would weaken the Court’s support for 
its decision in Riley. 
The Riley decision is important because it potentially impacts 
every person in the United States that owns a cell phone and keeps 
any type of personal information stored on such a device. Ninety-one 
percent of American adults own a cell phone of some sort,2 with 
nearly two-thirds of Americans now owning a “smartphone”3—a cel-
lular device with internet or cellular network accessing capabilities 
and an operating system capable of running downloaded applica-
tions.4 Cell phones have become an integral part of society. Cell 
phones are no longer a rare convenience or commodity that some 
people have; on the contrary, society is trending towards a deeper 
 
 1. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2495 (2014) (The Court instructed that the “an-
swer to the question of what police must do before searching a cell phone seized incident to an 
arrest is accordingly simple—get a warrant.”). 
 2. Maeve Duggan, Cell Phone Activities 2013, PEW RESEARCH CENTER CTR. 2 (Sept. 
16, 2013), http://www.pewinternet.org/files/old-media//Files/Reports/2013/PIP_Cell%20 
Phone%20Activities%20May%202013.pdf. 
 3. Aaron Smith et al., U.S. Smartphone Use in 2015, PEW RESEARCH CTR. 2 (Apr. 1, 
2015), http://www.pewinternet.org/files/2015/03/PI_Smartphones_0401151.pdf (“64% of 
American adults now own a smartphone of some kind, up from 35% in the spring of 2011.”). 
 4. Smartphone, TECHOPEDIA.COM, https://www.techopedia.com/definition/2977/ 
smartphone (last visited Feb. 18, 2017).  
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dependence on constant cell phone interaction.5 Cell phones and 
smartphones alike are used for numerous functions, many of which 
are very private or personal in nature to the phone’s owner.6 Indeed, 
for many Americans, cell phones likely contain “the privacies of 
life.”7 With cell phone and smartphone ownership, use, and depend-
ence on the rise, the Court’s decision comes at a highly influential 
time.8 
The Court’s decision now gives guidance to arresting officers on 
what they can and cannot do in searching an arrestee’s phone. How-
ever, the Court failed to address several issues that are likely to ap-
pear before lower courts. Due to the Court’s failure to foresee or 
speak to these issues, the lower courts will likely struggle to reconcile 
the new issues with the Court’s guidance that it is unlawful for offic-
ers to search an arrestee’s cell phone incident to a lawful arrest. 
These issues include potential scenarios that the Court did not ad-
dress in its decision that would bolster the government’s interest in 
having access to an individual’s cell phone. Likewise, alternative ex-
 
 5. A recent survey showed that 47% of U.S. adults would not be able to last 24 hours 
without their cell phones. Smart phones only rank behind the internet and hygiene when 
ranked by importance in people’s lives. Jessica Durando, 47% of Adults Couldn’t Last a Day 
Without Smartphone, Survey Says, USA TODAY (June 30, 2014, 2:56 PM), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-now/2014/06/30/consumers-cell-phones-
americans/11780165/. Another survey showed that only 28% of people would be able to live 
without their cell phones, with more people being willing to live without caffeine, sex, or televi-
sion before they would be willing to give up access to the internet. Allyssa Birth, More Than 7 
in 10 Americans Think Technology Has Become Too Distracting and Is Creating a Lazy Soci-
ety, THE HARRIS POLL (Nov. 4, 2015, 5:00 AM), http://www.theharrispoll.com/health-and-
life/Technology-Too-Distracting-Lazy-Society.html. 
 6. See Smith et al., supra note 3, at 5 (“Smartphones are used for much more than call-
ing, texting, or basic internet browsing. Users are turning to these mobile devices as they navi-
gate a wide range of life events: 
• 62% of smartphone owners have used their phone in the past year to look up infor-
mation about a health condition. 
• 57% have used their phone to do online banking. 
• 44% have used their phone to look up real estate listings or other information about a 
place to live. 
• 43% to look up information about a job. 
• 40% to look up government services or information. 
• 30% to take a class or get educational content. 
• 18% to submit a job application.”).  
 7. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).  
 8. The Court sarcastically described the pervasive and insistent role cell phones have in 
society today by stating “the proverbial visitor from Mars might conclude [cell phones] were an 
important feature of human anatomy.” Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014); see 
also Duggan, supra note 2 (showing that there is a high likelihood that most individuals lawfully 
arrested will be in possession of a cell phone).  
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ceptions to the warrant requirement may be relied upon or abused by 
officers in an attempt to gain access to the cell phone data without 
first acquiring a warrant. Furthermore, changes in technology in the 
upcoming years may cause lower courts substantial difficulties as they 
attempt to reconcile the Court’s decision with new technological ad-
vancements. 
Part I will provide background for the Article, first describing the 
history of the search incident to arrest doctrine and explaining the 
cases that led to the Supreme Court’s review of this issue. Next, Part 
II will detail and examine the Court’s decision and analysis in Riley v. 
California. Lastly, Part III will describe the positive results of the 
Court’s decision, followed by a critique of the potential difficulties 
that the Court’s decision may cause, as well as the impact of these un-
intended results in future cases. 
I. THE HISTORY OF THE SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST 
EXCEPTION 
This Part will explain the background for the debate in Riley v. 
California. First, this Part will give a brief description of the Fourth 
Amendment and its scope. Next, it will describe the search incident 
to arrest doctrine with an analysis of the cases that have defined this 
exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. Lastly, it 
will provide an outline of the decisions of Riley v. California and 
United States v. Wurie to help to show the contrast between the low-
er courts’ differing opinions, ultimately leading to the Supreme 
Court’s involvement in resolving the issue. 
A. The Fourth Amendment 
A warrant is typically required in order for law enforcement offi-
cials to search a person or their property. The Fourth Amendment 
states: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, pa-
pers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall 
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable 
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing 
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.9 
The Fourth Amendment prescribes that a specific warrant, based 
 
 9. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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upon probable cause, must be issued before a person’s “houses, pa-
pers, and effects” can be searched or seized. 
The Framers developed this Amendment in response to the in-
trusive search and seizure practices of the British prior to the Ameri-
can Revolution, specifically to counter the British’s use of writs of as-
sistance.10 Writs of assistance gave custom officers the authority to 
search homes, shops, cellars, warehouses, and other places for illegal-
ly smuggled goods.11 Defiant actions taken by the Framers and early 
Americans ultimately led to the adoption of the Fourth Amendment, 
implemented in order to protect colonists’ privacy and property 
against the unlimited—and often unsubstantiated—discretion of gov-
ernment officials to which they had previously been subjected.12 
The Fourth Amendment also requires that warrants particularly 
describe the things to be seized, thus making general searches under 
the Amendment impossible. It is the Supreme Court’s role to inter-
pret the Fourth Amendment and define its boundaries.13 The Court 
explained that in relation to the Fourth Amendment warrant re-
quirement, “nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing 
the warrant.”14 Congress has been mindful of this in enacting the 
laws governing the issue and execution of search warrants, limiting 
seizures to things particularly described.15 In sum, “searches conduct-
ed outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or 
magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amend-
ment[.]”16 
 
 10. M. Blain Michael, Reading the Fourth Amendment: Guidance from the Mischief 
that Gave It Birth, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 905, 907–08 (2010); see also United States v. Wurie, 728 
F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2013). 
 11. Michael, supra note 10. 
 12. Id.; see also Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) (“[The Fourth 
Amendment’s] protection consists in requiring that . . . inferences be drawn by a neutral and 
detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive 
enterprise of ferreting out crime.”); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455 (1948) (“Ab-
sent some grave emergency, the Fourth Amendment has interposed a magistrate between the 
citizen and the police. This was done not to shield criminals nor to make the home a safe haven 
for illegal activities. It was done so that an objective mind might weigh the need to invade that 
privacy in order to enforce the law.”). 
 13. See CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE: AN ANALYSIS OF CASES AND CONCEPTS 18 (5th ed. 2008). 
 14. Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927). 
 15. Id.; FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e)(2)(A) (“[T]he warrant must identify the person or proper-
ty to be searched, identify any person or property to be seized, and designate the magistrate 
judge to whom it must be returned.”). 
 16. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 
347, 357 (1967) (footnote omitted)).  
JENKINS.MACRO.3.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/26/2017  8:48 PM 
437] OMG—Not Something to LOL About 
441 
B. Search Incident to Arrest Exception 
While warrantless searches are presumptively unlawful, “the ul-
timate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.”17 
Thus, “the warrant requirement is subject to certain exceptions.”18 
Although the Fourth Amendment rule of obtaining a warrant before 
searching a person’s property applies in most situations, the Court 
accepted “a few specifically established and well-delineated excep-
tions[]” as exemptions to this rule.19 One such allowance is the search 
incident to arrest exception. 
The search incident to arrest exception allows the police, during 
a lawful arrest, to search “the arrestee’s person and the area within his 
immediate control[.]”20 The traditional basis for the search incident 
to arrest exception is that it is presumed reasonable for an arresting 
officer to search for weapons, instruments of escape, and evidence of 
a crime during the course of the arrest in order to protect the of-
ficer’s safety and prohibit the destruction of relevant evidence.21 
This exception to the warrant requirement has long been recog-
nized under American law,22 with its first true application happening 
in 1927. In Marron v. United States,23 officials charged the petitioner 
with conspiracy to commit various offenses against the National Pro-
hibition Act.24 Petitioner insisted that a ledger and certain bills were 
obtained illegally through a search and seizure that violated his 
Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights because the items seized were 
 
 17. Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006) (internal quotation omitted); see 
also Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995) (“Where a search is undertaken 
by law enforcement officials to discover evidence of criminal wrongdoing, . . . reasonableness 
generally requires the obtaining of a judicial warrant.”). 
 18. Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 403. 
 19. Gant, 556 U.S. at 338. 
 20. Id. at 339 (quoting Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969) (internal quota-
tion omitted)). 
 21. See, e.g., Chimel, 395 U.S. at 753; United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 802–03 
(1974).  
 22. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914) (stating that officers can 
“search the person of the accused when legally arrested, to discover and seize the fruits or evi-
dences of crime.”). The Court in Riley stated that this exception to the warrant requirement has 
been “well accepted” and that the label of “exception” is “something of a misnomer” due to 
warrantless searches incident to arrest occurring much more often than searches conducted 
pursuant to a warrant. See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2482 (citing 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 
5.2(b) p.132, n.15 (5th ed. 2012)).  
 23. Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 192 (1927). 
 24. Id. at 193. 
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not with him on his person during the arrest.25 Holding for the Gov-
ernment, the Supreme Court stated that the bills and ledgers were 
lawfully seized as an incident to arrest, providing the officers with “a 
right without a warrant contemporaneously to search the place in or-
der to find and seize the things used to carry on the criminal enter-
prise.”26 The Court continued to establish the exception by narrow-
ing and expanding the doctrine in a variety of cases,27 ultimately 
preparing the way for Chimel v. California,28 the case that established 
the search incident to arrest doctrine as we understand it today.29 
In Chimel, the Supreme Court held that a warrantless search of a 
defendant’s entire house was not justified based solely on the fact that 
it occurred as part of his valid arrest. Officers suspected Chimel of 
burglarizing a coin shop.30 Despite the lack of consent, officers 
searched Chimel’s entire house finding coins and other evidence that 
supported the burglary conviction.31 The Court explained that a 
search incident to arrest would be reasonable in two scenarios, name-
ly to maintain officer safety32 and to preserve evidence of the crime.33 
The Court also explained that justification existed to search not only 
the arrestee’s person, but also the area “within his immediate con-
trol,” further defining that phrase as “the area from within which [the 
arrestee] might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evi-
 
 25. Id. at 193–94. 
 26. Id. at 199 (emphasis added). 
 27. Compare Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 358 (1931) (limit-
ing the doctrine by disallowing officers to search through an arrestee’s office), and Trupiano v. 
United States, 334 U.S. 699, 708 (1948) (narrowing the doctrine yet again by holding an inci-
dent search of a distillery following the manager’s arrest violated his Fourth Amendment 
rights), with Harris v. United States 331 U.S. 145, 153 (1947) (expanding the scope of the doc-
trine to allow officers to search arrestee’s entire house), and United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 
U.S. 56, 65–66 (1950) (following the analysis in Harris to allow the incidental search of an ar-
restee’s office in order to gather evidence).  
 28. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 752 (1969). 
 29. Riley  v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2483 (2014) (“Chimel . . . laid the groundwork 
for most of the existing search incident to arrest doctrine.”); United States v. Wurie, 728 F.3d 
1, 3–4 (1st Cir. 2013) cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 999 (2014), aff’d sub nom. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 
2473 (“The modern search-incident-to-arrest doctrine emerged from Chimel v. California[.]”). 
 30. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 753.  
 31. Id. at 753–54. 
 32. Id. at 763 (“[I]t is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person arrested in 
order to remove any weapons that the latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect 
his escape. Otherwise, the officer’s safety might well be endangered, and the arrest itself frus-
trated.”). 
 33. Id. ([I]t is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and seize any evi-
dence on the arrestee’s person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction.”). 
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dence.”34 The officer’s search in Chimel’s home was not motivated by 
either officer safety or the preservation of evidence, and thus was held 
unconstitutional.35 
Decisions since Chimel have further developed and refined our 
understanding of the search incident to arrest doctrine. In United 
States v. Robinson,36 the Court addressed how the search incident to 
arrest exception applied to searches of a person.37  Upon the arrest in 
Robinson, the arresting officer felt an object he could not identify in 
Robinson’s coat pocket during a pat down.38 He removed the object 
to discover it was a cigarette package containing what the officer be-
lieved to be something other than cigarettes.39 The officer opened 
the package and found fourteen capsules of heroin concealed there-
in.40 The Court held that the search was valid, stating that it is within 
a police officer’s authority to conduct “a full search of [a] person” in-
cident to a lawful arrest.41 Because the officer found the package of 
cigarettes containing the heroin capsules during a pat down of Rob-
inson following a lawful arrest for driving with a revoked license, the 
Court held the warrantless search was constitutional.42 The Court 
further clarified: 
The authority to search the person incident to a lawful custodial ar-
rest, while based upon the need to disarm and to discover evidence, 
does not depend on what a court may later decide was the probabil-
ity in a particular arrest situation that weapons or evidence would in 
fact be found upon the person of the suspect. A custodial arrest of a 
suspect based on probable cause is a reasonable intrusion under the 
Fourth Amendment; that intrusion being lawful, a search incident 
to the arrest requires no additional justification. It is the fact of the 
lawful arrest which establishes the authority to search, and we hold 
that in the case of a lawful custodial arrest a full search of the person 
is not only an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth 
Amendment, but is also a “‘reasonable’” search under that Amend-
 
 34. Id. (internal citation omitted).  
 35. Id. at 768.  
 36. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 218 (1973).  
 37. Id. at 220.  
 38. Id. at 222–23. 
 39. Id. at 223. 
 40. Id.  
 41. Id. at 235.  
 42. Id. at 236. 
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ment.43 
The following year, the Court decided United States v. Ed-
wards.44 Edwards was lawfully arrested and charged with attempting 
to break into the city’s post office and taken to the local jail.45 Upon 
discovering that entry to the post office had been made through a 
wooden window frame, the police seized Edwards’ pants and shirt in 
the hopes of matching paint chip samples from the window frame 
with paint chips that were on his clothes.46 The Court held such ac-
tions valid under the Fourth Amendment, affirming the Court of Ap-
peal’s reversal of the trial court’s decision.47 In its decision, the Court 
stated: 
The police were . . . entitled to take from Edwards any evidence of 
the crime in his immediate possession, including his clothing . . . . 
. . . When it became apparent that the articles of clothing were evi-
dence of the crime for which Edwards was being held, the police 
were entitled to take, examine, and preserve them for use as evi-
dence, just as they are normally permitted to seize evidence of crime 
when it is lawfully encountered.48 
The Court again addressed the search incident to arrest exception 
in United States v. Chadwick.49 In Chadwick, officers made a lawful 
arrest of three individuals suspected of transporting a footlocker full 
of drugs.50 The officers made the arrest once the arrestees loaded the 
footlocker into the trunk of a car, but before they closed the trunk lid 
or turned the vehicle on.51 The arrestees and the footlocker were tak-
en to the Federal Building, where officials searched the footlocker an 
hour and a half later and found marijuana inside.52 The Court found 
this search impermissible as the officials conducted it more than an 
hour after the federal agents put the arrestees into custody and 
gained “exclusive control of the footlocker.”53 The Court supported 
 
 43. Id. at 235.  
 44. United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800 (1974).  
 45. Id. at 801. 
 46. Id. at 801–02. 
 47. Id. at 802. 
 48. Id. at 804–05.  
 49. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 1 (1977), abrogated on other grounds by Cal-
ifornia v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 565 (1991). 
 50. Id. at 3–4. 
 51. Id. at 4. 
 52. Id. at 4–5. 
 53. Id. at 15. 
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its decision by explaining that the agents were not in any danger since 
the arrestees could no longer access the property to seize a weapon or 
destroy relevant evidence.54 
The Court continued to clarify the Chimel rationales in New 
York v. Belton.55 In Belton, a police officer stopped a vehicle in which 
Belton was a passenger for exceeding the speed limit.56 The officer 
approached the vehicle and noticed a strong smell of marijuana, as 
well as an envelope on the vehicle’s floor, which the officer suspected 
contained marijuana.57 The officer arrested the occupants of the car 
for unlawful possession of marijuana.58 After searching each of the 
occupants, the officer searched the passenger compartment of the 
car, found a jacket belonging to Belton, unzipped one of the pockets, 
and discovered cocaine.59 Belton was also indicted for possession of a 
controlled substance.60 The Court held the search of Belton’s jacket 
did not violate the Fourth Amendment as it was a search incident to a 
lawful arrest.61 Because the jacket was located in the passenger com-
partment of the car, the Court held it was “within the arrestee’s im-
mediate control,” as explained in Chimel.62 The Court found the po-
lice could permissibly search the passenger compartment of the car as 
well as the contents of any containers63 found in the passenger com-
partment.64 
Only a few years ago, the Court again addressed the search inci-
dent to arrest exception in Arizona v. Gant.65 Officers arrested Gant 
 
 54. Id. (“Once law enforcement officers have reduced luggage or other personal property 
not immediately associated with the person of the arrestee to their exclusive control, and there 
is no longer any danger that the arrestee might gain access to the property to seize a weapon or 
destroy evidence, a search of that property is no longer an incident of the arrest.”). 
 55. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 454 (1981). 
 56. Id. at 455. 
 57. Id. at 455–56. 
 58. Id. at 456. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 462–63. 
 62. Id. at 462; see Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969). 
 63. “Container” is defined as “any object capable of holding another object.” Belton, 453 
U.S. at 460 n.4. 
 64. Id. at 461 (“Such a container may, of course, be searched whether it is open or 
closed, since the justification for the search is not that the arrestee has no privacy interest in the 
container, but that the lawful custodial arrest justifies the infringement of any privacy interest 
the arrestee may have.”). 
 65. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 332 (2009). The Court in Gant distinguished its deci-
sion in Belton by rejecting a broad interpretation of Belton and allowing the search of a vehicle 
once the arrestee has been secured. Id. at 343. 
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for driving on a suspended license, handcuffed him, and locked him 
in a patrol car before they searched his car and found cocaine in a 
jacket pocket.66 Relying on the twin rationales listed in Chimel, the 
Court found that a search of an arrestee’s vehicle incident to arrest is 
lawful in certain circumstances.67 According to the Court, “Police 
may search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s arrest only if the 
arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at 
the time of the search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle con-
tains evidence of the offense of arrest.”68 
C. Disagreement Among Lower Courts 
While the Supreme Court has addressed the search incident to 
arrest exception in numerous cases, lower courts have struggled and 
disagreed for years about how to best apply the Supreme Court’s ju-
risprudence to the search of data on a cell phone seized during a law-
ful arrest. Circuit and state courts were divided on the issue until the 
Court’s decision in Riley. Even among those that agreed, the ration-
ales used to allow or prohibit a warrantless search of a cell phone dif-
fered from court to court. 
1. Circuit splits 
A large number of circuit courts and state courts approved or par-
tially approved warrantless searches of an arrestee’s cell phone data.69 
Those courts that fully approved a warrantless search relied on a va-
riety of approaches in order to justify the search. For example, in 
People v. Diaz,70 the Supreme Court of California relied on Robin-
son and Edwards to support the conclusion that an officer can freely 
search a cell phone when incident to a lawful arrest with no justifica-
tion beyond the fact of the arrest itself.71 Other courts have relied on 
other justifications to allow a warrantless search of a cell phone, in-
cluding the need to preserve evidence.72 When it comes to personal 
 
 66. Id. at 335. 
 67. Id. at 339–40. 
 68. Id. at 351. 
 69. See United States v. Wurie, 728 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2013); see also H. Rick Yelton, 
Riley v. California: Setting the Stage for the Future of Privacy by Distinguishing Between Digi-
tal and Physical Data, 60 LOY. L. REV. 997, 1011–12 (2014).   
 70. People v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501, 501 (Cal. 2011).  
 71. Id. at 504–05.  
 72. See, e.g., United States v. Murphy, 552 F.3d 405, 411 (4th Cir. 2009) (reiterating the 
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items found on an individual during an arrest, courts have placed sig-
nificant weight on law enforcement’s need to protect against the de-
struction or tampering of evidence in justifying the warrantless search 
of personal items incident to arrest.73 
Several courts have partially approved the warrantless search of 
an arrestee’s phone, allowing the search of only specific data files in-
cident to a lawful arrest. For example, the Seventh Circuit held that 
an officer’s search of a phone to find the number of that particular 
phone was allowable as it was minimally invasive and justified by the 
rationale stated in Chimel.74 Several state courts have also found suf-
ficient justification in this same purpose to allow a limited search of a 
cell phone.75 Despite the majority of courts supporting the warrant-
less search of a cell phone incident to a lawful arrest, a number of 
courts have held oppositely for a variety of reasons. For example, the 
Supreme Court of Ohio held that cell phones are distinguishable 
from closed containers in that the individual carrying the phone has a 
high expectation of privacy in the contents of his or her phone.76 
Similarly, in United States v. Park,77 the court concluded that a cell 
phone is a possession within an arrestee’s immediate control, to be 
governed by the Chadwick standard as opposed to the Robinson or 
Edwards standards.78 Under these standards, such an item cannot be 
searched once it is in the exclusive control of the police, unless exi-
 
point that the need to preserve evidence justifies the warrantless search of a phone); United 
States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 259–60 (5th Cir. 2007) (“[Police officers] may also, without any 
additional justification, look for evidence of the arrestee’s crime on his person in order to pre-
serve it for use at trial.”).  
 73. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 225 (1973); see also United States v. Ortiz, 
84 F.3d 977, 984 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding preservation of evidence supported search of elec-
tronic pager). 
 74. United States v. Flores-Lopez, 670 F.3d 803, 809 (7th Cir. 2012). Note also that the 
Seventh Circuit suggested other justifications could be imagined for a more extensive search. 
Id. at 810.   
 75. Hawkins v. State, 723 S.E.2d 924, 925–26 (Ga. 2012) (affirming the lower court’s 
decision that a cell phone, for purposes of a search incident to arrest, could be treated in the 
same manner as a traditional physical container); Commonwealth v. Phifer, 979 N.E.2d 210, 
215–16 (Mass. 2012) (allowing the search of the phone’s call log because the officers here had 
probable cause to believe the telephone’s recent call list would contain evidence relating to the 
crime for which he was arrested).  
 76. State v. Smith, 920 N.E.2d 949, 954–56 (Ohio 2009).  
 77. United States v. Park, No. CR 05-375SI, 2007 WL 1521573, at *12 (N.D. Cal. May 
23, 2007). 
 78. Id. at *1 (“[A] modern cellular phone, which is capable of storing immense amounts 
of highly personal information, is properly considered a ‘possession within an arrestee’s imme-
diate control’ rather than as an element of the person.”). 
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gent circumstances exist. Most recently, the Supreme Court of Flori-
da held that, under Gant, police officers are prohibited from search-
ing an arrestee’s cell phone removed from his person.79 According to 
that court, such removal creates a situation where the phone can no 
longer be used as a weapon against the arresting officer, and the ar-
restee cannot destroy any evidence contained on the phone.80 
The differences in application and understanding of the search 
incident to arrest doctrine again appeared when the California Court 
of Appeals addressed the issue in Riley v. California, and when the 
First Circuit took on the case of United States v. Wurie. 
2. Riley v. California 
Riley was involved in a shooting where he and several other gang 
members shot at a rival gang member as they drove by in his vehi-
cle.81 Officers later stopped Riley for driving with expired registration 
tags, and once the officers established his connection to the shooting, 
they arrested him and seized his phone.82 Later, information the offi-
cials obtained from the phone linked Riley to the shooting and re-
sulted in his conviction on counts of firing at an occupied vehicle, as-
sault with a semi-automatic firearm, and attempted murder.83 
The California Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s rejec-
tion of Riley’s argument that the warrantless search violated his 
Fourth Amendment rights.84 The court relied on Diaz, a California 
Supreme Court case permitting a warrantless search of cell phone da-
ta incident to arrest, so long as the cell phone was immediately asso-
 
 79. Smallwood v. State, 113 So. 3d 724, 734–35 (Fla. 2013). 
 80. Id. at 735 (“Gant demonstrates that while the search-incident-to-arrest warrant ex-
ception is still clearly valid, once an arrestee is physically separated from an item or thing, and 
thereby separated from any possible weapon or destructible evidence, the dual rationales for 
this search exception no longer apply.”). 
 81. People v. Riley, No. D059840, 2013 WL 475242, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 8, 2013), 
cert. granted in part sub nom. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 999 (2014) and rev’d and remand-
ed sub nom. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2473 (2014). 
 82. Riley, No. D059840, 2013 WL 475242, at *1–2. 
 83. Id. at *3. The information found on Riley’s phone connected him to gang activity. 
For example, officers noticed that some words in the phone were preceded by the letters 
“CK”—a label that the officers believed stood for “Crip Killers,” a slang term for members of 
the Bloods gang. Detectives also found on the phone videos of young men sparring while 
someone yelled “Blood” as encouragement to keep fighting. Police also found photographs of 
Riley standing in front of a car they suspected had been involved in the shooting a few weeks 
earlier. See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2480–81.  
 84. Riley, No. D059840, 2013 WL 475242, at *6. 
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ciated with the arrestee’s person.85 The court found Riley’s cell 
phone was immediately associated with his person when he was ar-
rested, and therefore the search of the cell phone was lawful despite 
the lack of an exigency existing.86 The California Supreme Court de-
nied Riley’s petition for review.87 
3. United States v. Wurie 
After observing Wurie perform a drug transaction with a man in 
the parking lot of a convenience store, an officer arrested him.88 Up-
on his arrest, the officer took Wurie’s phone and other personal be-
longings from him.89 While at the station, officers noticed via the 
phone’s external caller ID screen that one of Wurie’s cell phones re-
peatedly received phone calls from a contact listed as “my house.”90 
The officers opened the phone, noticing a picture on the background 
of a young woman holding a baby set as the wallpaper.91 The officers 
navigated to the call log where they were able to locate the number 
associated with the caller ID.92 Using this number, the officers pulled 
up the address associated with the phone number using an online 
white pages directory.93 This information led to the officers obtaining 
a search warrant for Wurie’s home; upon execution of the warrant, 
the officers found drugs, drug paraphernalia, and a firearm.94 The of-
ficers then charged Wurie with possession with intent to distribute 
and distributing cocaine, as well as being a felon in possession of a 
firearm. The district court found Wurie guilty on all three counts af-
ter it denied Wurie’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained 
through the search of his phone.95 
The First Circuit reversed the district court’s decision. In its 
analysis, the First Circuit first expressed its support of a bright-line 
 
 85. Id.; see People v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501, 505 (Cal. 2011). 
 86. Riley, No. D059840, 2013 WL 475242, at *6. 
 87. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2481. 
 88. United States v. Wurie, 728 F.3d 1, 1 (1st Cir. 2013). 
 89. Id. at 2.  
 90. Id. The officers were able to see the caller ID, and the “my house” label, in plain 
view.  
 91. Id.  
 92. Id. Note that in locating the number, the officers only pressed two buttons on 
Wurie’s phone.  
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id.  
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rule as opposed to a subjective, fact-specific rule.96 In denying the 
Government’s arguments to apply the reasoning of Edwards and 
Robinson,97 the First Circuit explained that the Government would 
only prevail by demonstrating that the warrantless search of Wurie’s 
cell phone was valid based on the Chimel standards.98 The court was 
“unconvinced” by the Government’s argument that either of the 
Chimel rationales applied, holding that “warrantless cell phone data 
searches are categorically unlawful under the search-incident-to-
arrest exception[.]”99 It further reasoned that the data stored on 
phones is “highly personal” and such an intrusion into a person’s pri-
vacy should not be violated flippantly.100 The First Circuit’s decision 
in Wurie created an official split in authorities, paving the way for the 
Supreme Court’s involvement in resolving the discrepancy between 
the circuits and among the lower courts. 
II. RILEY V. CALIFORNIA 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in both Riley v. California 
and United States v. Wurie, combining them into a single decision. 
The issue before the Court, present in both Riley and Wurie, was 
whether the police may, without a warrant, search digital information 
on a cell phone seized from an individual who has been lawfully ar-
rested.101 The justices unanimously agreed in a 9-0 decision that a 
warrant is generally required, absent exigent circumstances, to search 
an arrestee’s cell phone data.102 The Court reached the final decision 
after weighing the legitimate governmental interests on one hand and 
an individual’s privacy on the other. 
This Part will first describe the Court’s analysis of the first con-
sideration, namely the Government’s interest in searching a cell 
 
 96. Id. at 6; see also Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 623 (2004). 
 97. The First Circuit stated, “[T]here are categories of searches undertaken following an 
arrest that are inherently unreasonable because they are never justified by one of the Chimel 
rationales.” Wurie, 728 F.3d at 7. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 12.  
 100. Id. at 8. The First Circuit found efficient police work an unpersuasive argument. See 
id. at 13 (“[W]arrantless cell phone data searches strike us as a convenient way for the police to 
obtain information related to a defendant’s crime of arrest . . . without having to secure a war-
rant.”); see also Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978) (“The mere fact that law enforce-
ment may be made more efficient can never by itself justify disregard of the Fourth Amend-
ment.”). 
 101. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2480 (2014). 
 102. Id. at 2485. 
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phone without a warrant. Second, this Part will analyze the second 
consideration, which is a person’s privacy as it relates to the content 
on a cell phone. Third, it will provide a description of the Court’s 
analysis of the Government’s arguments and the decision’s foreseea-
ble impacts, including a mention of the opinion’s concurrence by Jus-
tice Alito. 
A. Governmental Interests 
The Court’s analysis opened with a brief overview of the two cas-
es to be decided,103 followed by a description of the cases that have 
helped define what is permissible within the search incident to arrest 
exception.104 
The Court’s analysis centered on its weighing of an individual’s 
privacy against the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.105 
Such a balancing test is generally the method used by the Court to 
determine whether a given type of search is exempt from the warrant 
requirement. The Court has traditionally weighed the degree to 
which a search intrudes on a person’s privacy against the degree to 
which the search is needed to promote legitimate governmental in-
terests.106 
The governmental interests recognized by the Court in allowing 
the warrantless search of a cell phone were focused on the two risks 
identified in Chimel: the potential danger to an officer’s safety and 
the possible destruction of evidence.107 While the Court has extended 
these governmental interests to the context of physical objects in the 
past,108 it deviated from this course in Riley, holding that digital data 
on a phone “bears little resemblance to the type of brief physical 
search considered in Robinson.”109 Although Robinson made search-
es incident to arrest reasonable regardless of “the probability in a par-
ticular arrest situation that weapons or evidence would in fact be 
found,”110 the Court ultimately decided that a warrantless search of 
 
 103. Id. at 2480. For the facts and summaries of these cases, see supra Sections I.C.2 & 3.  
 104. The Court focused on its decisions in Chimel, Robinson, and Gant. For a descrip-
tion of each of these cases, as well as other cases relating to the search incident to arrest doc-
trine, see supra Section I.B. 
 105. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484.  
 106. See, e.g., Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999).  
 107. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969). 
 108. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236 (1973). 
 109. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2485. 
 110. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235.  
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cell phones was disconnected to the justification underlying the 
Chimel exception.111 
1. Officer safety 
The Court determined that the concern of officer safety was not 
sufficiently present to justify the search of a cell phone without a war-
rant.112 While the actual physical cell phone could potentially be used 
as a weapon, the digital data stored on a cell phone posses no legiti-
mate threat to officer safety, nor can it assist an arrestee’s escape. The 
Court determined that the physical aspects of a phone could be 
searched to determine whether it could be used as a weapon.113 How-
ever, because the data on a phone could not threaten the officer once 
the phone was seized, it could not be searched. 
The Court determined that the search of a cell phone did not rise 
to the level of uncertainty that “unknown physical objects . . . always 
pose,” such as the cigarette pack in Robinson.114 The difference rec-
ognized by the Court between physical objects and digital data on 
cell phones is that officers do not know what they will find in physical 
objects—such as in Robinson where the arresting officer did not 
know what the hard objects in the cigarette pack were or whether it 
posed a risk to his safety—but they do know what they will find when 
they search a cell phone, namely data, which does not pose a threat to 
officers’ safety. The Court rejected the United States and California 
arguments that a search may ensure officer safety in an indirect way, 
such as alerting officers that the arrestee’s comrades may be traveling 
to the site of arrest to assist in the arrestee’s escape. While the Court 
recognized that this and other circumstances are possible, they do 
“not justify dispensing with the warrant requirement across the 
board.”115 
 
 111. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2485; see also Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 119 (1998) (declin-
ing to extend Robinson to the issuance of citations due to the Chimel justifications not being 
present in that situation; officer safety was only a minor threat, and destruction of evidence was 
not present at all).  
 112. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2485–86.  
 113. For example, the Court suggested that an officer could examine the physical aspects 
of a phone to ensure that a razor blade was not hidden between the phone and its case. Id. at 
2485.  
 114. Id.  
 115. Id. at 2486.  
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2. Preservation of evidence 
The Court focused a considerable amount of its opinion on the 
second Chimel rationale—“preventing the destruction of evidence”—
before deciding that the governmental interests were too low to justi-
fy a warrantless search exception to cell phones.116 The risk of de-
struction of evidence by the arrestee is almost completely eliminated 
once he or she is placed under arrest. By doing such, the officer re-
moves any risk or possibility of the arrestee deleting incriminating 
data that may be on the phone. 
The United States and California suggested two situations where 
digital evidence on a phone could nonetheless be subject to potential 
destruction: remote wiping and data encryption. The Court first re-
jected these arguments by pointing out that the Chimel justification 
focuses on the arrestee’s ability to conceal or destroy evidence, not 
the ability of third parties to do so. As mentioned before, once an ar-
restee has been placed under arrest, his or her own ability to destroy 
or conceal evidence contained on his or her cell phone is eliminated. 
Furthermore, the Court stated that it had “little reason to believe 
that either problem is prevalent.”117 According to the Court, officers 
can easily protect against remote wiping by either turning the phone 
off, or placing the phone into an enclosure that isolates the phone 
from radio waves. As in the case of officer safety, if an officer feels 
that circumstances suggest that the arrestee’s phone will be remotely 
wiped or irreversibly encrypted, the officer can always rely on the ex-
igent circumstance exception “to search the phone immediately.”118 
According to the Court, the Chimel concerns are not salient in 
warrantless cell phone search cases. Thus, the Court determined that 
the government’s interest in not obtaining a warrant before searching 
an arrestee’s phone incident to arrest was very low. 
B. Individual’s Privacy 
The second part of the weighing test that the Court conducted 
was considering the privacy interest of those being taken into police 
custody. The Court first explained the diminished privacy interests 
 
 116. Id. at 2486–88.  
 117. Id. at 2486.  
 118. Id. at 2487. Officers that find a phone in an “unlocked” state may also reasonably 
disable the phone’s automatic locking feature in order to preserve evidence while a warrant is 
obtained. Id. at 2488.  
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that an arrestee has. While a search of a person is justified, in part by 
a reduced expectation of privacy caused by the arrest, “[n]ot every 
search is acceptable solely because a person is in custody.”119 When 
privacy interests are significant enough, a search will require a war-
rant, despite the diminished expectation of privacy of the arrestee.120 
Through this understanding, the Court ultimately determined that 
the privacy concerns involved with modern cell phones are categori-
cally different from any other search approved by the lower courts 
under the Robinson and Chimel standards.121 Therefore, the Court 
analyzed the privacy implications involved in searching an arrestee’s 
cell phone on its own grounds. 
1. Quantitative and qualitative differences 
The Court first analyzed the quantitative and qualitative differ-
ences between cell phones and other physical objects.122 Cell phone 
capacity has drastically evolved and changed over recent years; the 
term “‘cell phone’” is arguably inappropriate since phones now have 
many of the same capabilities that a computer has.123 Perhaps the 
most significant evolution in cell phone technology is the amount of 
storage capacity available on phones. For a person to carry a physical 
copy of every piece of information that is available to them on their 
cell phone would be impracticable—if not impossible—to say the 
least. 
The Court recognized several “interrelated consequences” of cell 
phone searches due to their huge storage capacity. First, cell phones 
have many different types of information all conveniently located in 
one place.124 This information, as a combined whole, reveals much 
more about the phone’s owner than each single piece of information 
 
 119. Id. at 2488 (quoting Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1979 (2013)); see also Unit-
ed States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 16 n.10 (1977).  
 120. Riley, 134 S. Ct., at 2488. A good example of this principle can be seen in the facts of 
Chimel: in that case, the search of the defendant’s entire house was not justified due to the in-
trusive nature of the search, despite the arrestee’s expectation of privacy being diminished due 
to the arrest. 395 U.S. at 768.  
 121. Riley, 134 S. Ct., at 2488–89 (2014). 
 122. Id. at 2489–91.  
 123. The Court recognizes that cell phones have the ability to function as “cameras, video 
players, rolodexes, calendars, tape recorders, libraries, diaries, albums, televisions, maps, or 
newspapers.” Id. at 2489. Some of the more personal features on a phone would include photos, 
videos, financial statements, medical information, personal messages such as text messages, 
emails, and social media messages, browsing history, and contacts. See id.  
 124. Id. at 2489.  
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independently. Second, due to the amount of data that can, and nor-
mally is, stored on a phone, a single type of information can be more 
intrusive than a physical counterpart would.125 Third, the data on a 
phone can be stored much longer than physical information.126 Last-
ly, because nearly every person the police encounter will be carrying 
a cell phone on which personal and sensitive information is likely 
stored,127 the likelihood of invading an individual’s privacy is much 
higher than in the past when such information was not regularly car-
ried by an individual at all times of the day.  
Additionally, the Court recognized how the information on a cell 
phone is qualitatively distinguishable from physical records.128 The 
information that can be acquired by searching an individual’s phone 
can give a unique perspective into that person’s private thoughts, in-
terests, or concerns. Location services can also pinpoint where that 
person has been recently. Likewise, many phones now have the abil-
ity to run application software (“apps”), which gives even more in-
sight into the owner’s life based on the apps that they have down-
loaded and the information that they have accessed or stored on 
those apps. 
2. Cloud computing 
The Court also considered the ability of modern cell phones to 
store information in the cloud.129 Such an ability adds another com-
plicated level to the search principles since information found on a 
cell phone often times is not actually “stored” on the actual device it-
self. This ability overcomes any Belton argument that a cell phone 
should be treated as a container whose contents may be searched in-
cident to an arrest.130 Because accessing information through cloud 
computing capacity is indistinguishable from accessing information 
stored on the actual phone itself, it is difficult to know whether the 
particular information being accessed is stored on the device or in the 
 
 125. See id. The example used by the Court is how the life of a cell phone owner could be 
essentially “reconstructed” based on the thousand of pictures on his or her phone, many of 
which would also have date and time stamps, location markings, and descriptions. This would 
not be possible to do with the few pictures that are found in an arrestee’s wallet.  
 126. Id. For example, call records are often stored on a phone for set amount of times 
(typically several months) or until newer calls erase past calls at the bottom of the list.  
 127. See supra notes 2 and 6; see also Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2490–91.  
 128. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2490–91. 
 129. Id. at 2491.  
 130. See supra notes 55–64; see also Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2491.  
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cloud. 
The cloud computing aspect of cell phones added additional 
weight to the privacy concern involved in searching an individual’s 
phone without a warrant. The Court concluded that based on its 
analysis of the lack of government’s interests versus the high likeli-
hood of intrusive privacy invasion, an individual’s privacy interests 
dwarf any legitimate concern expressed by the government. 
C. Government’s Arguments and Foreseeable Impacts of the Riley 
Decision 
The United States and California introduced various reasons for 
permitting warrantless cell phone searches.131 The Court disagreed 
with each of these proposals and found the reasoning to be either 
flawed or contrary to the Court’s general preference to provide clear 
guidance to law enforcement through categorical rules. 
The United States proposed “that the Gant standard be imported 
from the vehicle context . . . .”132 However, as the Court noted, the 
Gant standard is unique to the vehicle context to allow a search for 
the sole “purpose of gathering evidence.” The Gant standard would 
not be appropriate to apply to cell phones because the standard was 
based on the “unique circumstances” in the vehicle context of a “re-
duced expectation of privacy” and “heightened law enforcement 
needs.”133 As was explained by the Court earlier in its decision, there 
is not a reduced expectation of privacy or a heightened need by law 
enforcement that would justify a warrantless search of a cell phone. 
The Court also rejected the Government’s argument that officers 
should be allowed to search certain areas of the phone based on their 
reasonable belief that relevant information is contained therein. The 
Court found that such an approach would “impose few meaningful 
constraints on officers” since it is not always possible to discern 
where information will be stored on a phone.134 Similarly, officers are 
not able to search a phone’s call log, as was at issue specifically in the 
Wurie case. However, searching a phone’s call log will involve 
searching more than just numbers such as contact information, pho-
 
 131. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2491. 
 132. Id. at 2492.  
 133. Id. (citing Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 632 (2004) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring)); Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 343 (2009); see also Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 
295, 303–04 (1999). 
 134. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2492. 
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tos, and other labels.135 
Finally, the Court rejected the argument that officers should be 
able to search cell phone data if the same information could be ob-
tained from another medium.136 The Court reasoned that even if it 
may be reasonable to search a wallet, which may contain a few family 
photos, it is unreasonable to then justify the search of thousands of 
pictures on an arrestee’s cell phone. If such a standard were applied, 
then officers would be able to search through information on one’s 
phone not normally carried with an individual in physical form on a 
daily basis, such as bank statements, video tapes, or photo albums.137 
The Court recognized that its decision would come at a poten-
tially high cost and would possibly adversely impact the ability of law 
enforcement to combat crime.138 However, it also noted that “the 
warrant requirement is an important working part of our machinery 
of government, not merely an inconvenience to be somehow 
‘weighed’ against the claims of police efficiency.”139 The Court sub-
mitted that this adverse impact could be mitigated by other case-
specific exceptions that may apply in justifying a warrantless search of 
a phone, such as the exigent circumstances exception.140 The decision 
concluded with a reaffirmation of the importance and scope of the 
Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of 
the California Court of Appeal, and affirmed the judgment of the 
First Circuit, providing a simple summary of the decision in its final 
statement: “Our answer to the question of what police must do be-
fore searching a cell phone seized incident to a arrest is accordingly 
simple—get a warrant.”141 
 
 135. Id. at 2492–93. Such was the case in Wurie where the arrestee had labeled the phone 
number as “my house.” 728 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 2013). 
 136. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2493.  
 137. Id. (“[I]t is implausible that [Riley] would have strolled around with video tapes, pho-
to albums, and an address book all crammed into his pockets.”). 
 138. Id.  
 139. Id. (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 481 (1971)).  
 140. See infra note 190.  
 141. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2495. Justice Alito concurred in part and concurred in the final 
judgment. He wrote to address two points separately. First, the reasoning for the search inci-
dent to arrest doctrine used by the Court is flawed; the reasoning of Chimel related to the law-
fulness of a search of the scene of an arrest, not the person of an arrestee. Furthermore, the ba-
sis for the rule has long been the need to obtain probative evidence, not officer safety and 
evidence preservation. Notwithstanding this point, Justice Alito agrees that it is the only work-
able alternative to have a categorical ban on warrantless searches of cell phones. Justice Alito’s 
second point in the concurrence questions whether this issue should be governed by statute 
rather than decisions by the judicial system. Justice Alito wrote, “[I]t would be very unfortunate 
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III. IMPACT OF RILEY V. CALIFORNIA 
The guidance of the Riley decision appears to be clear: warrant-
less searches of cell phones are unlawful, unless a valid exception ap-
plies. The impact of this decision will be influential and far-reaching. 
The effect of the Riley decision will be a positive step in protecting 
an individual’s privacy against unlawful intrusion by police officers. 
However, the Supreme Court failed to consider several implications 
of their decision, which lower courts will have to grapple with in the 
future. The first portion of this Part will detail the positive results of 
the Riley decision. The following portion will detail some of the po-
tential shortcomings of the Riley decision, as well as the possible is-
sues that lower courts will likely need to address due to the Supreme 
Court’s lack of guidance on those subjects. 
A. Positive Results 
The Supreme Court’s decision finally provides clarity to lower 
courts and the legal community about the appropriate standard for 
warrantless searches of cell phones. Though this Article draws atten-
tion to some of the complications the Riley decision will invoke, the 
positive impacts of the Court’s decision should not be overlooked. 
The successes, as described below, include the Court providing a 
clear, categorical rule as opposed to a case-by-case determination, the 
Court providing guidance as to how cellular devices differ from other 
physical objects, and the Court protecting privacy rights of individu-
als from having their cell phones searched indecently. These success-
es will positively affect the legal system and privacy rights of arrestees 
moving forward. 
1. Clear categorical rule 
The decision in Riley is as clear as one would expect from the na-
tion’s highest court. With its unanimous decision, the Supreme 
Court sent a clear message that officers are not allowed to search an 
individual’s phone upon arrest without a warrant. Such unanimity 
among the justices makes following the Court’s guidance easier for 
 
if privacy protection in the 21st century were left primarily to the federal courts using the blunt 
instrument of the Fourth Amendment. Legislatures, elected by the people are in a better posi-
tion than we are to assess and respond to the changes that have already occurred and those that 
almost certainly will take place in the future.” Id. at 2495–98; see infra note 172. 
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lower courts when faced with similar cases. The Supreme Court pre-
fers to provide clear guidance to law enforcement through categorical 
rules.142 “[I]f police are to have workable rules, the balancing of the 
competing interests . . . ‘must in large part be done on a categorical 
basis—not in an ad hoc, case-by-case fashion by individual police of-
ficers.’”143 Such categorical rules provide clarity in an often-confusing 
and ever-changing area of the law. 
The clear rule makes training officers much easier.144 Officers 
now know and can teach other officers that, absent circumstances 
that cause the officer to fear for his or her safety or reasonably sus-
pect that the evidence on the phone is under immediate risk of being 
destroyed, officers are not allowed to search the phone of an arrestee. 
This bright-line rule will reduce the number of cases where officers 
are searching an arrestee’s phone, eliminating the need to look at 
each situation on a case-by-case basis and ultimately reducing the 
amount of litigation related to this particular issue. 
The decision will have the positive impact of reducing the 
amount of cases that courts have to review. In a court system that is 
already bogged down and backlogged with too many cases,145 a re-
duction in caseloads is an absolute success. Any case that does involve 
an officer searching an arrestee’s cell phone without a warrant will 
 
 142. While I agree that in this case a clear categorical rule is the best option, note that the 
Court recently also held that a judgment-based test was the best option to be applied to a simi-
lar Fourth Amendment issue. See Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1564 (2013). In 
McNeely, the Supreme Court concluded that in some drunk-driving investigations where an 
officer wants to do a blood test on the driver of a stopped vehicle, certain circumstances may 
give rise to the drawing of blood without the driver’s consent and without a warrant. 133 S. Ct. 
at 1557–63. The Court rejected a bright line rule, instead looking at a “totality of the circum-
stances” to determine whether warrantless blood tests performed on drunk drivers were appro-
priate. Id. at 1564. Such a rule goes against the Court’s “general preference” of categorical 
rules. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2491. This goes to show that certain issues may be best resolved by a 
clear categorical rule—such as in warrantless searches of cell phones—but such a rule is by no 
means necessary or required. See United States v. Wurie, 728 F.3d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 2013) (How-
ard, J., dissenting).  
 143. Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705 n.19 (1981) (quoting Dunaway v. New 
York, 442 U.S. 200, 219–20 (1979) (White, J., concurring)); see also Harold Laidlaw, Shouting 
Down the Well: Human Observation As A Necessary Condition of Privacy Breach, and Why 
Warrants Should Attach to Data Access, Not Data Gathering, 70 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 
323, 343–44 (2015) (arguing that because “privacy” is an undefined term by the Court, a cate-
gorical rule is better equipped to protect against the infringement of people’s privacy rights 
than on a case-by-case basis).  
 144. Not to mention the life of a law student studying for a criminal procedure final. 
 145. See Wheels of Justice Slow at Overloaded Federal Courts, S. CAL. PUB. RADIO 
(Sept. 27, 2015), http://www.scpr.org/news/2015/09/27/54669/wheels-of-justice-slow-at-
overloaded-federal-court/. 
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likely not make its way through the court system thanks to the clear 
guidance provided by the Court in its decision; both sides will be able 
to analyze the strength of their position based on Riley and reach a 
settlement rather than have to take the matter before a judge. 
Furthermore, the Court was not blind to the possibility of cir-
cumstances arising that might require an officer to search the ar-
restee’s phone without a warrant. Despite a clear ban on such a 
search, the Court’s decision still allows officers to use discretion in 
maintaining their safety, ensuring that the arrestee does not escape, 
and preserving evidence against tampering or destruction if it appears 
that the only way to protect against each of these risks is to search the 
phone without first obtaining a warrant. Officers still retain some 
flexibility and discretion in how to best serve and protect the public. 
2. Physical objects vs. digital data 
The Court recognized that there were quantitative and qualita-
tive differences between digital data and physical items.146 With con-
stant changes and advancements in technology, it was appropriate for 
the Court to acknowledge these differences. The Court identified the 
key difference between cell phones and other physical items, which is 
the cell phone’s ability to store significant amounts of personal da-
ta.147 Comparing a cell phone to any other type of container would 
have been disproportionate and inappropriate. Modern cell phones 
are essentially computers148 and contain many of the same features 
and functions that can be found on desktop computers or laptops. 
 
 146. See supra Section II.B.1. 
 147. Modern cell phones can come with up to 256 gigabytes of storage. See Compare 
iPhone Models, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/iphone/compare/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2017). 
This is the same—and even more—storage capacity as some laptop computers, see Tech Specs: 
MacBook Air, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/macbook-air/specs.html (last visited Apr. 8, 
2017), and even half this amount of storage space is enough to hold 5,699 software applications, 
18,639 songs, and 56,988 photos. John Brownlee, This is How Many Apps, Songs, Videos, 
Photos and Games You Can Fit on a 128GB iPad, CULT OF MAC (Jan. 29, 2013, 9:53 AM), 
http://www.cultofmac.com/213073/this-is-how-many-apps-songs-videos-photos-games-you-
can-fit-on-a-128gb-ipad/.  
 148. See United States v. Flores-Lopez, 670 F.3d 803, 805 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting Unit-
ed States v. Lucas, 640 F.3d 168, 178 (6th Cir. 2011)) (“Analogizing computers to other physi-
cal objects when applying Fourth Amendment law is not an exact fit because computers hold so 
much personal and sensitive information touching on many private aspects of life . . . There is a 
far greater potential for the ‘inter-mingling’ of documents and a consequent invasion of privacy 
when police execute a search for evidence on a computer.”); see also United States v. Walser, 
275 F.3d 981, 986 (10th Cir. 2001); United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1275 (10th Cir. 
1999). 
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Smart phones have the capability of storing photographs, videos, 
written and audio messages (i.e. text messages, emails, and voicemail), 
personal contacts, calendar appointments, web search and browsing 
history, purchases, financial and medical records, and many other 
types of personal data. Such functions take a cell phone out of the 
traditional “container” arena, and move it into a category more com-
parable to a computer or home. The potential invasion of privacy in a 
search of a cell phone is greater than in a search of a “container” in 
the conventional sense. 
The Court wisely recognized this important distinction. Had the 
Court ruled narrowly on just cell phones, the holding might not have 
extended so easily to future technology-related privacy issues.149 Be-
cause the Court had the foresight to look not only at the current state 
of technology, but also the high likelihood of technology continuing 
to become more pervasive, its decision will continue to be applicable 
for many years. The reach of the decision is foreseeably applicable to 
future cases involving other ‘computer-like devices,’ such as laptop 
computers, tablets, smart watches, and other devices that store large 
amounts of personal data. 
A similar success was the Court’s categorical rule for all cell 
phones, regardless of their make, model, or storage and processing 
capabilities. The two phones seized and searched in Wurie and Riley 
were very different.150  The Court decided that rather than making a 
distinction and drawing a line between phones that could and could 
not be searched, it would instead create a clear ban on the warrantless 
search of any cellular phone. Drawing a distinction between different 
types of phones would have been unwise considering that “[e]ven the 
dumbest of modern cell phones gives the user access to large stores of 
information,” and private data could still be stored on the crudest of 
cell phones.151 Additionally, a rule forcing officers to differentiate be-
tween phones based on their storage and processing capabilities 
would have been unworkable and unreasonable.152 It would also re-
quire officers to learn and memorize the capabilities of constantly 
 
 149. See Yelton, supra note 69, at 1029–30. 
 150. Riley’s phone was a “smartphone” with a broad range of functions, large storage ca-
pacity, and internet connectivity features, while Wurie’s phone was a traditional “flip-phone” 
capable of a smaller range of features compared to a smartphone. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 
2473, 2480–81 (2014). 
 151. Flores-Lopez, 670 F.3d at 806.  
 152. See Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 623 (2004). 
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changing electronic devices.153 
Furthermore, as part of its analysis, the Court mentioned the 
possibility of officers accessing information not actually stored on the 
device itself, but rather in the cloud. It is becoming increasingly 
common that mobile devices store personal user data in the cloud as 
opposed to on the actual device itself.154 This ability to store infor-
mation in the cloud takes the arguments from Belton—that a cell 
phone is a container—and throws them out the window. A cell phone 
could no longer be characterized as a “container” when the infor-
mation that is being accessed on it is not actually held on the phone, 
but rather in the cloud through the assistance of an off-site storage 
facility.155 The general trend is for individuals to store more infor-
mation in the cloud than on the actual device.156 As the First Circuit 
stated in Wurie regarding data stored in the cloud, “[W]e believe that 
it may soon be impossible for an officer to avoid accessing such in-
formation during the search of a cell phone or other electronic de-
vice.”157 A positive result of the Court addressing this issue in its deci-
sion is to set a precedent for future cases related to data stored in the 
cloud. 
3. Protection of privacy rights 
The Court’s decision is a huge success for the protection of U.S. 
citizen’s privacy rights. The Fourth Amendment serves as a protec-
tion to an individual’s subjective expectation of privacy if that expec-
tation is both reasonable and justifiable.158 Due to cell phones’ ability 
to hold large amounts of private information, the Court correctly de-
termined that they should be held to a higher standard of privacy as 
compared to other physical items. Individuals today store more per-
sonal information on their cell phones than could ever fit in a wallet, 
pocket, purse, briefcase, backpack, or any other traditional container 
that an individual may usually carry on their person, and that previ-
 
 153. Schlossberg v. Solesbee, 844 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1170 (D. Or. 2012). 
 154. See James E. Cabral et al., Using Technology to Enhance Access to Justice, 26 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 241, 268 (2012).  
 155. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981). 
 156. See Drew Henry, 5 Storage Trends to Transform Mobile, EE TIMES (July 20, 2015, 
1:32 PM), http://www.eetimes.com/author.asp?section_id=36&doc_id=1327172; Christina 
Bonnington, In Less Than Two Years, a Smartphone Could be Your Only Computer, WIRED 
(Feb. 8, 2015, 3:42 AM), http://www.wired.com/2015/02/smartphone-only-computer/.  
 157. United States v. Wurie, 728 F.3d 1, 8 n.8 (1st Cir. 2013). 
 158. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967).  
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ous courts had allowed officers to search incident to arrest.159  Even if 
we consider containers that individuals would not normally carry 
with them on a day-to-day basis—storage lockers, suitcases, filing 
cabinets, etc.—such containers still do not have the same storage ca-
pacities or capabilities that a modern smartphone has. This implicates 
an individual’s privacy rights on an entirely different level. 
The type of sensitive information that individuals store on their 
phones now would be akin to the personal information and posses-
sions stored in the home. After the Riley decision, the information on 
a cell phone could be considered the most private and protection-
worthy data possible.160 Regardless of the hierarchy, the Court’s 
comparison adds strength to the type of protection that cell phones 
are to be allotted. The Fourth Amendment protects an individual’s 
privacy in his or her home more than any other situation; as the Su-
preme Court put it, “When it comes to the Fourth Amendment, the 
home is first among equals.”161 The Court strongly protects an indi-
vidual’s privacy rights in his or her home, and now this same protec-
tion has been extended to an individual’s cell phone as well.162 And 
rightly so; as the Court noted, an individual arguably carries around 
in his or her pocket now more sensitive information than could be 
acquired by looking through all of his or her personal effects in his or 
her home.163 
Furthermore, the Riley decision is a success because the rule pro-
 
 159. Cf. United States v. Molinaro, 877 F.2d 1341, 1344 (7th Cir. 1989) (searching wallet 
and papers); United States v. Gonzalez-Perez, 426 F.2d 1283, 1285–87 (5th Cir. 1970) (search-
ing papers contained in pockets, wallets, and purses); United States v. Frankenberry 387 F.2d 
337, 339 (2d Cir. 1967) (searching diary); Grillo v. United States, 336 F.2d 211, 213 (1st Cir. 
1964) (searching papers in wallet); see also Schlossberg v. Solesbee, 844 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1170 
(D. Or. 2012) (searching defendant’s digital camera and all of its pictures without a warrant).  
 160. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2490–91 (2014) (“Indeed, a cell phone search 
would typically expose to the government far more than the most exhaustive search of a house: 
A phone not only contains in digital form many sensitive records previously found in the home; 
it also contains a broad array of private information never found in a home in any form—unless 
the phone is.”). 
 161. Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414 (2013). 
 162. See Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511–12 (1961). The Court stated that 
at the “very core” of the Fourth Amendment “stands the right of a man to retreat into his own 
home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.” Id. at 511.  
 163. Riley, 134 S. Ct. 2490–91. The First Circuit also recognized a situation where a cell 
phone could also provide direct access into an individual’s home. United States v. Wurie 728 
F.3d 1, 8–9 (1st Cir. 2013). Through the use of an app, phones can connect their owners direct-
ly to a home computer’s webcam so that users can monitor the inside of their homes remotely. 
While such a possibility is tenuous at best, it is nonetheless a possibility, and one that should be 
guarded against.  
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tects arrestees involved in low-level crimes from having their privacy 
disproportionately infringed upon. While officers are trained on ap-
propriate searches and seizures,164 it is not difficult to conjure up a 
situation where an arrest for a minor crime leads to an officer inde-
cently violating an individual’s privacy. For example, in Newhard v. 
Borders,165 the officer arrested the defendant for driving while intoxi-
cated.166 In the course of a routine search incident to arrest, the ar-
resting officer retrieved the defendant’s cell phone from his pocket, 
conducted a warrantless search of the phone’s contents, and viewed 
multiple photos of the defendant and his girlfriend nude and in “sex-
ually compromising positions.”167 These images found by the arrest-
ing officer were wholly unrelated to the defendant’s drunk driving ar-
rest.168 As if such an intrusion was not already invasive enough, the 
seizing officer showed these images to several other officers and sta-
tionhouse employees, and also alerted members of the public “that 
the private pictures were available for their viewing and enjoy-
ment.”169 Due to this ensuing scandal, the defendant lost his job as a 
public school teacher and had long lasting ramifications on the de-
fendant’s working career and personal life.170 Although this is an ex-
treme example, the Court’s ruling protects against such cases becom-
ing commonplace. The Court made it clear with its decision, as well 
as other recent decisions,171 that it intends to strictly protect privacy 
rights as technology continues to become more entrenched in Ameri-
cans’ lives. 
Cell phones place vast quantities of personal information literally 
in the hands of individuals. Denying the Court’s sound reasoning of 
 
 164. See Search and Seizure Field Guide, Search Incident to Arrest 21–22, 
https://www.aclu.org/files/FilesPDFs/ALPR/oregon/Washington%20County%20Sheriff's%20
Office/30012-30050%20Search%20and%20Seizure%20Field%20Guide.pdf (last visited Mar. 
30, 2017).  
 165. Newhard v. Borders, 649 F. Supp. 2d 440, 440 (W.D. Va. 2009). 
 166. Id. at 443–44. 
 167. Id. at 444.  
 168. Id.  
 169. Id.  
 170. Id.  
 171. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 946–47 (2012) (holding that attachment of 
Global–Positioning–System (GPS) tracking device to a vehicle, and subsequent use of that de-
vice to monitor vehicle’s movements on public streets, was a search within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment); see also Laidlaw, supra note 143, at 327 (“[R]ecent Supreme Court cases, 
most notably United States v. Jones and Riley v. California, have signaled a willingness by the 
Court to adopt a new jurisprudence sensitive to the capacity of technological advance to com-
promise privacy.”).  
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the threat of excessive privacy intrusion would be absurd; as stated 
above, there are many successes created by the Court’s decision. 
However, the Court failed to consider several potential impacts of its 
decision that could stand as future obstacles for arresting officers and 
lower courts applying the Riley decision. 
B. Negative Results 
Despite some of the positive aspects of the Court’s decision, 
many negative implications are likely to follow in the future as well. 
Several potential shortcomings may plague lower courts, serving 
them the difficult task of applying the Court’s guidance in likely-to-
arise cases. Some of these negative effects are the result of the 
Court’s failure to give weight to any other governmental interests 
outside the Chimel rationales, the possibility of officers relying on 
other exceptions in order to search phones without a warrant, and 
further-removed technological devices that do not lend themselves to 
exact comparison to a phone or computer. Lower courts will have to 
wrestle with these issues, potentially forcing the Supreme Court to 
enter again to clarify some of the discrepancies. 
1. Alternative governmental interests 
The Court weighed two specific governmental interests—officer 
safety and evidence preservation—in reaching the conclusion that 
governmental interest in searching an arrestee’s phone without a war-
rant is low. However, the Court failed to consider other pertinent 
governmental interests that are also implicated during the arrest of an 
individual. These governmental interests, when considered along 
with the other twin rationales discussed by the Court, strengthen the 
government’s argument in favor of searching phones without a war-
rant.172 
One such governmental interest is efficient police work.173 The 
Court recognized that its decision would “have an impact on the abil-
 
 172. One such governmental interest is the need to obtain probative evidence. This inter-
est was pointed out in Justice Alito’s concurrence in Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2495 
(2014) (Alito J., concurring). While not explained in depth here, it is worth noting that Justice 
Alito was “not convinced . . . that the ancient rule on searches incident to arrest is based exclu-
sively (or even primarily) on the need to protect the safety of arresting officers and the need to 
prevent the destruction of evidence.” Id. Instead, Justice Alito believed the basis for the search 
incident to arrest rule was the “need to obtain probative evidence.” Id.  
 173. The Court gave this interest mere lip service in its decision. See id. at 2493. 
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ity of law enforcement to combat crime.”174 It also recognized that 
cell phones are tools used by criminal enterprises to coordinate and 
communicate among its members. The information that officials can 
acquire from cell phones would be highly valuable in keeping poten-
tially dangerous criminals off the streets.175 Setting aside the privacy 
implications, safety to the public by removing criminals off of the 
streets is an ever-present interest that should be considered. The de-
bate between privacy and protection is a hotly disputed issue, with 
many individuals being comfortable with some invasion into their 
privacy in order to maintain societal and national security.176 One 
might argue that if you have nothing to hide, then there is no reason 
to be concerned about someone looking through your phone.177 In-
deed, being able to do so would likely lead to uncovering other 
wrongdoings by criminals during their arrest.178 However, the Court 
found privacy more important than protection while also recognizing 
that its decision would adversely impact police work. Indeed, the 
Court stated, “[p]rivacy comes at a cost.”179 
The Court reconciles this “cost” by relying on the increased 
availability afforded to officers to easily request and receive warrants. 
The Court mentioned that changes in technology have provided of-
ficers easier and quicker access to warrants if they suspect that there 
is incriminating information on an arrestee’s phone.180 Indeed, such 
procedures allow swifter warrant issuance to the arresting officer.181 
 
 174. Id.  
 175. Id.  
 176. See Sophia Rosenbaum, Privacy vs. protection: Public wrestles with what’s most im-
portant, NBC NEWS (June 6, 2013), http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/06/06/18802435-
privacy-vs-protection-public-wrestles-with-whats-most-important?lite (quoting several U.S. 
citizens, stating that they are not opposed to governmental oversight and intrusion into their 
personal data in order to protect against potential threats). 
 177. Id.  
 178. This issue is what both Riley and Wurie debated. Both were arrested, and the infor-
mation on their phones led to them being charged of further, more severe crimes.  
 179. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2493.  
 180. See Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1572–73 (2013) (“[P]olice can often re-
quest warrants rather quickly these days. At least 30 States provide for electronic warrant appli-
cations.”). In many states, officers can receive a warrant by calling a judge and giving him or her 
the necessary information. The judge can then authorize the officer to affix the judge’s signa-
ture to the warrant and proceed with the search. See, e.g., ALA. R. CRIM. PROC. 3.8(B) (2012–
2013); ALASKA STAT. § 12.35.015 (2012); IDAHO CODE §§ 19–4404, 19–4406 (2004); MINN. R. 
CRIM. PROC. 36.01–36.08. (2010 AND SUPP. 2013); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46–5–222 (2012). 
Note, however, that 40% of states do not have an electronic warrant system in place. For offic-
ers of these states, the traditional method of receiving a warrant must be followed.  
 181. For example, see Utah, e-Warrants: Cross Boundary Collaboration 1 (2008) (de-
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However, due to the ban on warrantless searches of an individu-
al’s phone upon arrest, the amount of requested warrants from the 
magistrate judge will increase. This will increase the delay in receiv-
ing a warrant. Similarly, with such easy and regular access, obtaining 
a warrant simply becomes a hoop officers must jump through rather 
than acting as a protection against unlawful intrusion into an individ-
ual’s privacy. Such easy and quick access may also create instances 
where officers request a warrant expecting to receive one, and before 
receiving it, begin to search an arrestee’s phone, implicating the pos-
sibility of officer’s reliance on the inevitable discovery doctrine in or-
der to begin the search without the warrant.182 Likewise, courts and 
judges now will be burdened with an increase in warrant granting, ra-
ther than focusing on the other cases they have on their dockets. The 
categorical rule was implemented in order to decrease litigation; by 
forcing officers to get a warrant to search an arrestee’s phone, court 
involvement will actually increase, creating heavier workloads for 
lower courts. 
In addition to the governmental interests not mentioned by the 
Court, there may have also been situations that the Court failed to 
consider in its analysis of the Government’s interest in preserving ev-
idence. The Court mentioned the possibility of remote wiping as a 
potential threat to the preservation of evidence. Along with this very 
real threat,183 it is not difficult to think of additional situations where 
cautious criminals may be alerted that their partner in crime has been 
detained, and thus will either transport or destroy valuable evidence. 
 
scribing Utah’s “e-warrant” procedure where officers, through the use of the online system, can 
electronically receive a warrant). This system has led to officers receiving warrants in as little as 
five minutes. See Jason Bergreen, Utah Cops Praise Electronic Warrant System, SALT LAKE 
TRIB., Dec. 26, 2008, at B1; see also Gregory T. Benefiel, DUI Search Warrants: Prosecuting 
DUI Refusals, 9 KAN. PROSECUTOR 17, 18 (Spring 2012), 
http://www.kcdaa.org/Resources/Documents/KSProsecutor-Spring12.pdf (“From the time the 
officer begins completing the search warrant affidavit form to the time the judge returns the 
signed search warrant is now about 15 minutes.”). 
 182. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 440–41 (1984) (holding that evidence obtained in 
violation of the defendant’s constitutional rights is admissible in court if it can be established 
that normal police investigation would have inevitably led to the discovery of the evidence); see 
also Brian S. Conneely & Edmond P. Murphy, Inevitable Discovery: The Hypothetical Inde-
pendent Source Exception to the Exclusionary Rule, 5 HOFSTRA L. REV. 137, 154–64 (1976). 
 183. Eight percent of individuals have installed software on their phone that would enable 
them to remotely wipe their phones. Smart phone thefts rose to 3.1 million in 2013, 
CONSUMERREPORTS.ORG (May 28, 2014, 4:00 PM), 
http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/news/2014/04/smart-phone-thefts-rose-to-3-1-million-
last-year/index.htm. Likewise, 7% of smartphone owners use some other form of encryption on 
their devices other than the lock screen. Id. 
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For example, one individual that is about to participate in a crime 
may instruct a friend that his or her failure to answer a phone call af-
ter a certain amount of call attempts should trigger the friend to 
move, conceal, or destroy other damning evidence of past or future 
crimes. While not every instance of a person’s failure to answer a 
phone call three or four times in a row will lead to the destruction of 
evidence, it is a possibility not addressed by the Court. Even without 
an agreement, a co-conspirator may be tipped off that their accom-
plice has been detained when the accomplice does not answer their 
phone calls or text messages after several attempts.184 An officer’s in-
ability to now look at incoming phone calls or messages may poten-
tially lead to the loss of valuable evidence. 
Similarly, some applications on a phone may alert an arrestee’s 
accomplices of their detention. Certain applications now allow you to 
monitor where another user of the application is located by tracking 
the phone’s location.185 An app can alert accomplices in a crime when 
one of their comrades is in custody if they observe the phone’s loca-
tion is at the police station. One might argue that such a situation 
could easily be prevented by officers placing the phone into a bag 
that blocks the signal, by powering off the device, or by turning off 
location services. However, the app can alert an accomplice who is 
monitoring his or her partner’s activities that some problem has oc-
curred if he or she is no longer able to track the other’s location. Fur-
thermore, if an officer fails to do one of these preventive measures, 
taking the phone to the police station will alert the accomplice of the 
detention, giving them time to either conceal or destroy evidence of 
other crimes.186 
In addition to some of these “distress calls,” some of the preven-
tative measures—turning off the phone, taking out the battery, disa-
bling location services—may still involve officers observing infor-
mation on an arrestee’s phone. For example, if an officer turns off an 
 
 184. The dissent in Wurie brings this point up as well. Judge Howard points out that 
Wurie’s “failure to answer these phone calls could have alerted Wurie’s confederates to his ar-
rest, prompting them to destroy further evidence of his crimes.” United States v. Wurie, 728 
F.3d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 2013). Judge Howard further asserts that this provided an objective basis for 
enhanced concern that evidence may be destroyed if the officers did not search the phone. Id. 
 185. See, e.g., About Find my Friends, APPLE, https://support.apple.com/en-
us/HT201493; Find My Lost Phone!, GOOGLE PLAY, 
https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.fsp.android.phonetracker&hl=en (last visited 
Mar. 30, 2017).  
 186. This situation could be easily prevented through the use of a signal-blocking bag, but 
it is unclear how often police officers actually use or have access to such items. 
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arrestee’s phone, he or she will often times illuminate the screen by 
pressing and holding the button that shuts down the device. In cases 
of older generation phones, such as the one in Wurie, an officer must 
actually open the phone in order to access the off button located on 
the inside of the phone. Opening the phone will automatically illu-
minate the screen, enabling the officer to see the main screen as he or 
she inspects the phone to make sure it has been powered off. Like-
wise, a smartphone that has a case that covers the front screen could 
only be turned off after opening the front flap and manually sliding 
or clicking on the screen to power the device down. In the course of 
both of these situations, the officer may observe the contents of a 
message that has been unread or a phone call that has been missed.187 
While such an alternative might be better than allowing officers to 
search the entire phone, these situations may result in officers relying 
on other exceptions to the warrant requirement based on their obser-
vations while turning the phone off. 
Another difficult situation that lower courts may confront is 
whether officers can search an arrestee’s phone without a warrant 
when that person was arrested while on the phone. What if the ar-
restee was speaking to another person when the officers recognized 
that a crime had occurred? What if the person is texting as the offic-
ers arrest him or her and the officers suspect the information sent 
could lead to the destruction of evidence? One might contend that 
such a situation would then fall under the exigent circumstances ex-
ception, but this exception could lead to other issues for the lower 
courts.188  
While these government interests do not detract from the privacy 
implications discussed by the Court, they nonetheless make the gov-
ernmental interest argument stronger in weighing it against privacy 
interests of individuals. 
 
 187. Most phones provide a service to users where the first portion of a text message, 
email, or alert appears on the phone screen, notifying the user of some of the content of the 
received message. See Use Notifications on iPhone, iPad, and iPod Touch, APPLE, 
https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT201925. These alerts may contain information that is 
viewed by the officer as he is taking preventative measures to preserve evidence. Such a situa-
tion may fall under the plain view exception, or the “freezing” of the scene while a warrant is 
obtained; however, this is something that lower courts will have to analyze in the future.  
 188. See infra Section III.B.2.a. 
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2. Alternative exceptions 
The Court’s decision has created a situation where officers may 
potentially rely on other exceptions to the warrant requirement in 
order to search an arrestee’s phone. The Riley decision does not 
make information on a cell phone immune from any type of search. 
Rather, officers can still acquire a warrant in order to search a phone. 
In addition to this, other exceptions may give officers the right to 
search an arrestee’s phone without a warrant. As the Court stated, 
“[E]ven though the search incident to arrest exception does not apply 
to cell phones, other case-specific exceptions may still justify a war-
rantless search of a particular phone.”189The exceptions that may 
prove difficult for officers and lower courts to apply are (a) the exi-
gent circumstances exception and (b) arrestees’ consent to search 
their cell phone’s data. 
a. Exigent circumstances. The Court specifically noted that the 
exigent circumstances exception could still apply in cases involving 
searches incident to arrest of cell phones.190 Whenever one of the ra-
tionales from Chimel—officer safety or evidence preservation—is 
present, the Court felt it would be “better addressed through consid-
eration of case-specific exceptions to the warrant requirement, such 
as the one for exigent circumstances.”191 Thus, when exigent circum-
stances appear, there is no need for an officer to obtain a warrant be-
fore conducting a search because the need for a warrant is overcome 
by a compelling need of law enforcement.192 Common compelling 
needs of law enforcement are potential destruction of evidence, po-
tential escape of suspects, and possible danger to the investigating of-
ficers or to citizens in the area where the search is to take place.193 If 
an officer’s life or the lives of others is in danger, that officer can con-
 
 189. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2494 (2014). 
 190. Id.; see also United States v. Wurie, 728 F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 2013) (“There are, how-
ever, other exceptions to the warrant requirement that the government has not invoked here 
but that might justify a warrantless search of cell phone data under the right conditions. Most 
importantly, we assume that the exigent circumstances exception would allow the police to 
conduct an immediate, warrantless search of a cell phone’s data where they have probable cause 
to believe that the phone contains evidence of a crime, as well as a compelling need to act 
quickly that makes it impracticable for them to obtain a warrant[.]”). 
 191. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2486.  
 192. See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 394 (1978); Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 
1856–57 (2011); see also Topic: Exigent Circumstances, CRIMPRO.COM, 
https://crimprocasebook.files.wordpress.com/2011/06/ladder3c1.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2017). 
 193. MARC L. MILLER & RONALD F. WRIGHT, CRIMINAL PROCEDURES: THE POLICE 
182 (4th ed. 2011). 
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tinue with the investigation in order to prevent the danger he or she 
fears is imminent.194 
For the exigent circumstances exception to apply, there must be 
an emergency situation justifying warrantless activity and there must 
be probable cause.195 The Court has clarified the requirements for ex-
igent circumstances as dependent on the severity of the crime com-
mitted and the extent of the privacy intrusion to be instigated by the 
warrantless search.196 Exigent circumstances vary with the seriousness 
of the crime; the showing becomes more difficult as the crime under 
investigation becomes less serious.197 Because “courts tend to demand 
greater justifications for warrantless searches of a house,”198 the same 
demand likely will be required for warrantless searches of cell phones 
as well, especially when considering the weighty import the Court 
has put on the personal nature of cell phone data. While the Court 
generally has been reluctant to find exigent circumstances,199 the 
Court has allowed exigent circumstances in the past,200 creating a po-
tential avenue for officers to abuse. If allowed to go unchecked, the 
exigent circumstances exception will swallow the warrant rule, thus 
making the Court’s decision potentially obsolete. Officers may also 
begin to game the system by abusing the exception for the sake of ef-
ficient police work. While this Article does not intend to suggest that 
the nation’s police force is corrupt, situations could arise where offic-
ers manipulate an investigation in order to apply the exigent circum-
 
 194. See, e.g., Warden Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298–99 (1967) (“The 
Fourth Amendment does not require police officers to delay in the course of an investigation if 
to do so would gravely endanger their lives or the lives of others.”); see also STEPHEN A. 
SALTZBURG & DANIEL J. CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 363 (8th ed. 2007) (“The 
exigent circumstances exception excuses the officer from having to obtain a magistrate’s deter-
mination that probable cause exists; it does not permit a search in the absence of probable 
cause. Besides needing probable cause to search, the officer must have probable cause to believe 
that the persons or items to be searched or seized might be gone, or that some other danger 
would arise, before a warrant could be obtained.”). 
 195. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY & LAURIE L. LEVENSON, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 219 (1st 
ed. 2008). 
 196. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 753 (1984). 
 197. See id. (“[A]pplication of the exigent-circumstances exception in the context of a 
home entry should rarely be sanctioned when there is probable cause to believe that only a mi-
nor offense . . . has been committed.”). 
 198. MILLER & WRIGHT, supra note 193, at 183.  
 199. See generally Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978) (rejecting a claim that there 
should be a blanket exception to the warrant requirement for all murder scenes).  
 200. See, e.g., Brigham City v. Stuart, 126 S. Ct. 1943 (2006) (allowing police to act with-
out a warrant if there is an emergency and the police believe that entering a premise will pro-
vide protection).  
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stances exception as opposed to obtaining a warrant. 
The Court’s decision in Riley may have also created a situation 
where officers are more likely to apply the exigent circumstance ex-
ception. While no such threat has actually occurred yet,201 it is con-
ceivable that a criminal may create a cell phone bomb undetectable 
on a cursory examination of the phone.202 Officers can inspect the ex-
terior of a phone, but now that they are unable to check the function-
ality of the phone, officers will be unaware that the phone is actually 
a weapon or an explosive instead of a normal functioning device. If 
even one such “phone bomb” injured or killed a law enforcement of-
ficial, then officers could objectively argue that they feared that they 
were in imminent danger any time they seized a cell phone, thus jus-
tifying a search of the phone in order to determine that it is a normal 
functioning phone instead of a weapon.203 Additionally, terrorists and 
radicals now have an opportunity available to them to get a bomb in-
side of a police vehicle, headquarters, or compound because they 
know that the phone will likely not be inspected as a supposed weap-
on.204 
The judiciary must analyze and review the use of the exigent cir-
cumstances exception on a case-by-case basis to determine whether 
the circumstances indeed required a search without a warrant.205 If 
 
 201. Hollywood has recognized the possibility of cell phones (and other less conspicuous 
items) to be used as weapons against officers and other government officials. See LAW ABIDING 
CITIZEN (Overture Films 2009) (judge’s cell phone used as a bomb, detonating when the judge 
answers a phone call); THE DARK KNIGHT (Warner Bros. 2008) (cell phone bomb smuggled 
into police station and detonated by a call from another phone killing officers and prisoners 
within the holding cell area); Breaking Bad: Negro y Azul (AMC Network Entertainment LLC. 
Apr. 19, 2009) (explosives stuffed inside a tortoise and detonated to kill DEA agents). 
 202. Erik Schechter, Could Terrorists Build a Bomb That Looks Like a Working 
Phone?, POPULAR MECHANICS (July 10, 2014), http://www.popularmechanics.com/flight/ 
a10935/could-terrorists-build-a-bomb-that-looks-like-a-working-phone-16972003/. Further-
more, although the argument may be improbable, the courts arguing in favor of the categorical 
rule likewise used events unlikely to occur in order to bolster their positions. See, e.g., United 
States v. Wurie, 728 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2013) (describing how a phone could be used to essen-
tially search a person’s home through the use of a webcam).  
 203. Powering on the phone may not be sufficient. Experts have determined that a clever 
enough terrorist might be able to build a bomb that passes as a working phone. Schechter, su-
pra note 202. Thus, officers would potentially need to search the phone further to determine its 
risk of danger. 
 204. If officers suspect that a phone could be used as a bomb, or that it contains “some 
immediately dangerous instrumentality, such as explosives, it would be foolhardy to transport it 
to the station house” without first opening the container, or in this case, the phone, checking 
for potential dangers, and disarming the weapon. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 24 
(1977); see also United States v. Johnson, 467 F.2d 630, 639 (2d Cir. 1972). 
 205. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2494 (2014) (“The critical point is that, unlike 
JENKINS.MACRO.3.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/26/2017  8:48 PM 
437] OMG—Not Something to LOL About 
473 
officers use this exception, it requires a court to examine whether an 
emergency justified a warrantless search in each particular case. This 
will lead to an increase in litigation, thus countering one of the inten-
tions of the Supreme Court in creating a bright-line rule. The practi-
cal result of officers finding convenient exceptions to the warrant re-
quirement will potentially be worse than if the Court had allowed 
searches in the general case. 
As technology continues to advance, lower courts will face more 
and more difficult questions regarding this exception. For example, 
what if the only personal item an arrestee has on his person is a cell 
phone containing all relevant information about him or herself? Will 
officers be able to rely on this exception when an arrestee is not co-
operating and all of the arrestee’s information is on the phone, in-
cluding his or her identification or other items typically held in a wal-
let or purse? Individuals now use phones as keys to homes and 
vehicles as well.206 Will the court allow an officer to access the phone 
if entering the home or vehicle is supported by exigent circumstances 
and probable cause? The Riley decision tends to suggest that the war-
rant requirement applies due to the individual’s privacy being impli-
cated. However, there may be some types of information that cannot 
be acquired in any other way, and in order to proceed, the officer 
needs that information held on the phone. If these things are eventu-
ally held exclusively on an individual’s phone, the lower courts will 
have to decide whether such a situation fits within the exigent cir-
cumstances exception. 
b. Consent. Another exception to the warrant requirement that 
may be problematic as a result of the Riley decision is consent. Offic-
ers may now try to convince arrestees to allow them to look at their 
phones—while avoiding undue influence or other negations of con-
sent—so as to circumvent the warrant requirement. Officers can con-
duct a full search without a warrant and without probable cause if the 
target of the search consents.207A search to which an individual con-
sents meets Fourth Amendment requirements.208 The need to rely on 
consent or a warrant appears to be the Court’s intention in the Riley 
 
the search incident to arrest exception, the exigent circumstances exception requires a court to 
examine whether an emergency justified a warrantless search in each particular case.”).  
 206. Todd Haselton, Audi Mobile Key Hands-On–This Android App Turns Your Phone 
Into Car Keys, TECHNOBUFFALO (Jan. 11, 2015), http://www.technobuffalo.com/videos/audi-
mobile-key-hands-on-this-android-app-turns-your-phone-into-car-keys/. 
 207. MILLER & WRIGHT, supra note 193, at 214. 
 208. Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624, 630 (1946).  
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decision. Indeed, it is far more common for officers to conduct 
searches based on consent than those allowed by a search warrant.209 
However, relying on consent can create additional problems for 
lower courts. Officers may try to use inappropriate means to coerce 
consent.210 For example, what if an officer asks for consent from the 
arrestee to search his or her phone, but also informs them that if they 
do not consent, the officer will simply just get a warrant to search the 
phone?211 While such attempts may or may not be ethical or legal, 
questionable attempts will give rise to an increase in litigation as in-
dividuals feel that they did not give voluntary or valid consent to 
search their phones. In addition to this point, almost all state courts 
agree that a totality of the circumstances determines whether a per-
son consented to a search.212 This will again cause more cases to be 
brought before the courts, requiring their judgment on the issues. 
The increase in litigation again goes against the reasoning for having 
a categorical rule in place, which is to reduce the amount of cases that 
come before the courts on that particular issue because the rule is 
clear on its face. 
Furthermore, research shows that most people, even those that 
have incriminating evidence, will consent to a search if asked by an 
officer.213 These studies show that many people—even those with ev-
idence to hide—unreflectively defer to the wishes of authority fig-
ures.214 Because Riley creates a situation where officers rely on con-
sent of individuals to search their phones, the categorical rule may 
actually lead to an increase in phone searches because officers will be 
asking to search more often, and arrestees are likely to allow it, even 
if they have incriminating information on their phones. 
Another related issue is that individuals are choosing to make 
their personal lives more public through social media. Could the po-
 
 209. MILLER & WRIGHT, supra note 193, at 214. 
 210. See WHITEBREAD & SLOBOGIN, supra note 13, at 299–307 (explaining the various 
circumstances affecting the analysis of voluntary consent as knowledge of the right, custody, 
force, show of force and threats, and personal characteristics). 
 211. Similar situations have occurred in past cases. See Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 
U.S. 543, 546 (1968) (describing situation where an officer informed a homeowner that he had 
a warrant, and then relied on the individual’s consent to search the house); see also State v. 
Brown, 783 P.2d 1278, 1280–82 (Kan. 1989) (describing situation where officer stated he would 
seek a warrant if the person did not consent to a search).  
 212. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973). 
 213. See Steven L. Chanenson, Get the Facts, Jack! Empirical Research and the Changing 
Constitutional Landscape of Consent Searches, 71 TENN. L. REV. 399, 447–55 (2004).  
 214. Id.  
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lice not gather as much information on this individual by looking at 
his or her online profiles made available to the public on the inter-
net? Similarly, could officers argue that if there is not a passcode on 
the phone, that there is implied consent to search the arrestee’s 
phone? Other people would have access to the phone’s content if no 
passcode were on the phone and the phone’s owner were to leave it 
somewhere.215 Are failures to password-protect a cell phone essential-
ly implied consent for others to look at that phone?216 In some states, 
officers that approach a home for the sole purpose of obtaining con-
sent to search the home must inform the resident that he or she does 
not have to consent.217Because cell phones are compared to homes as 
far as privacy concerns go, are officers under the same obligation to 
inform cell phone owners that they are not required to consent to the 
search? Is it possible for third parties to consent to the search of an 
arrestee’s phone to which the third party also has access?218 There are 
no clear answers to these questions. Such issues may likely arise in fu-
ture cases before the lower courts, creating difficult judgment calls 
for judges to make. 
3. Other technological devices and advancements in technology 
While the Supreme Court’s decision will likely apply to other 
“computer-like” devices, the line between which devices are comput-
er-like and which devices are not is unclear. Cell phones now have a 
 
 215. Most people do not take any steps to secure their phone in the case that it is stolen, 
lost, or taken from them. See Herb Weisbaum, Most Americans Don’t Secure Their 
Smartphones, CNBC (Apr. 26, 2014), http://www.cnbc.com/2014/04/26/most-americans-
dont-secure-their-smartphones.html (stating that 34% of all smartphone owners do absolutely 
nothing, including not creating a simple code to lock the screen, in order to protect their 
phones); cf. BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RES. SYS., CONSUMERS AND MOBILE 
FINANCIAL SERVICES 6 (March 2015), http://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/consumers-
and-mobile-financial-services-report-201503.pdf (“Consumers appear to be more cognizant of 
the need to protect the personal information stored on their phones, as they are increasingly 
using passwords to protect their smartphones. The share of smartphone owners who password 
protect their phone increased to 69 percent in 2014, from 61 percent in 2013 and 54 percent in 
2012.”). 
 216. This argument likely holds little weight in court because it would be similar to saying 
that because a person leaves the front door of their home open or unlocked that police officers 
could then assume they had consent to search it. While this is not a strong argument, it is still a 
situation that could arise and that would lead to more litigation in the lower courts. 
 217. See, e.g., State v. Brown, 156 S.W.3d 722, 731 (Ark. 2004).  
 218. See Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 106 (2006) (explaining that a third party has 
actual authority to consent to a warrantless search of a home, and thus presumptively also a cell 
phone, by the police when the third party shares common authority over the home, or as ap-
plied to our scenario, a cell phone).  
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clear rule in that they cannot be searched. However, it is less clear 
when it comes to other computer-like devices such as laptops, tablets, 
palm pilots, or other computing devices with storage capacity and 
processing capabilities. It is very likely that such devices will follow 
the same rule since they have many of the same storage capabilities 
and processing functionalities that a modern cell phone does and 
would likely implicate the same privacy concerns that the Court 
acknowledge in Riley. 
However, the line is blurred when it comes to devices that lack 
significant storage capacities or functioning capabilities. For example, 
a variety of digital devices—such as the Apple Watch, Google Glass-
es, Fitbit, or other wearable Bluetooth accessories for a phone219—
provide individuals access to an assortment of features that the typical 
phone has. These devices, however, are limited in their storage ca-
pacity and do not mirror all of the functioning capabilities that a cell 
phone has. Would these items be searchable incident to a lawful ar-
rest? It is unclear how the lower courts trying to reconcile these de-
vices with the Court’s ruling in Riley would rule on such an issue.220 
Similarly, it remains unclear how courts will deal with situations 
involving hard drives, USB drives, or thumb drives found on an ar-
restee’s person. These devices have huge amounts of storage capacity, 
but they do not possess the computing functionalities that a phone 
does. Furthermore, it is unlikely that such items contain data that is 
private in nature. The courts will have to deal with these cases in the 
likely not-so-distant future and determine whether they are covered 
under Riley, or if officers are allowed to search such items under the 
search incident to arrest doctrine. 
With the digitalization of everything, it is more likely than not 
that the Court’s decision will need to be revisited again soon. Expo-
 
 219. How lower courts will handle devices that track the owner’s location and movement 
is unclear. Examples of such devices are Garmin watches, Fitbit, or Nike Fit technology. Such 
technology will track the user’s location, physical activity, heart rate, pace, and even certain 
phone notifications. Will such technology also be protected under the Riley decision? Likely 
so, but lower courts will have to grapple with these issues. As technology continues to advance 
and becomes more engrained in each item a person wears or carries with him or her on a daily 
basis, arresting officers will be faced with difficult decisions and challenges as to what items are 
under Riley’s protection. Courts will have establish precedent, and it is likely that the changes 
in technology to come will force the Supreme Court or legislature to become involved in re-
solving the matter.  
 220. It is conceivable to picture lower courts viewing such devices as either a gateway to 
access the personal information on the phone, or as stand alone devices that do not possess 
nearly as much personal information that the cell phone does.  
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nential growth of technology over time will make it increasingly dif-
ficult to stay atop the ever-changing technological advancements.221 
Such changes will continue to occur at an accelerated rate.222 Similar-
ly, changes in technology may change many of the justifications that 
the Court relied so heavily on in reaching its decision. For example, 
with the rise of voice-activated technology, an arrestee may still have 
access to his or her phone despite it not being in his or her posses-
sion. The Court rejected the argument of the need to preserve evi-
dence by pointing out that the Chimel justification focuses on the ar-
restee’s ability to conceal or destroy evidence, not the ability of third 
parties to do so. The Court reasoned that once an officer places an 
arrestee under arrest, the arrestee’s own ability to destroy or conceal 
evidence contained on his or her cell phone is eliminated. However, 
the Court failed to consider the possibility of an arrestee’s ability to 
access functions or data on the phone without having to have physical 
access to the phone. Voice-command technology has now adapted to 
only respond to one user, and such technology could potentially al-
low an owner to erase incriminating data held on the phone through 
use of his or her voice. This technology would threaten the preserva-
tion of evidence, undermining one of the Court’s justifications for 
not allowing warrantless searches of cell phones.223 Similarly, some 
Bluetooth technology allows users to control phone functions from 
wearable devices.224 Massive technological changes and shifts will 
likely create entirely new problems the Court did not consider, and 
that lower courts will be forced to face and reconcile. 
CONCLUSION 
How each of these possible issues evolves with time and how the 
lower courts will deal with each of these potential conflicts remains 
 
 221. Michael G. Daigneault, A Matter of Foresight, CUES (July 2013), 
http://www.cues.org/article/view/id/A-Matter-of-Foresight.  
 222. Emerging Technology Overview, TRACE CTR. (Feb. 16, 2007), 
http://trace.wisc.edu/tech-overview/indexe9e5.html?attachment_id=256. 
 223. Although the phone could be removed from the owner and taken outside of voice 
range, the possibility of a voice-command data wipe is a realistic threat, and one that will con-
tinue to grow in plausibility considering the amount of voice-activated technology devices out 
on the market. See Johnny Crowder, Have You Met Alexa, Amazon’s Siri Competitor Yet?, 
THE AMERICAN GENIUS (Jan. 25, 2015), http://theamericangenius.com/tech-news/met-alexa-
amazons-siri-competitor-yet/ (describing Amazon’s attempt to create a voice-activated device 
to compete with Apple’s Siri and Google Now).  
 224. For example, an arrestee could use a smart watch to send or delete text messages de-
spite being physically separated from the phone, but still within Bluetooth connectivity range.  
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undetermined. In the mean time, the successes of the Court’s deci-
sion will provide clear guidance to lower courts in regards to cell 
phones being seized and searched during a search incident to a lawful 
arrest. The bright-line rule established by the Supreme Court’s deci-
sion is a solid victory for privacy protection. However, as circum-
stances change and technology continues to evolve and advance, the 
Court’s decision in Riley may lead to many other unintended and un-
anticipated consequences, burdening the lower courts with cases that 
are not exactly congruent to a cell phone search. The lower courts 
will either have to analyze the case within the standard set out in Ri-
ley, or to differentiate it as outside the Riley boundaries. Either way, 
lower courts will have a difficult time adjusting without further guid-
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